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Abstract
SOFR is expected to phase out USD LIBOR in the near future. The two rates are intrinsically
different and are affected by various idiosyncratic features. Recently, the relevance and long-term effects
of these differences have received increased academic interest. I begin by synthesizing the literature on
meaningful ways in which the two rates are distinct. Then, I contribute to this knowledge by studying the
SOFR-LIBOR spread more closely. Fundamentally, LIBOR includes term structure and risk SOFR lacks,
and the rates have underlying markets of drastically different liquidity. I regress the daily spread of 1M
LIBOR and 3M LIBOR to overnight SOFR on metrics for liquidity, term structure and credit risk,
achieving significance on all three variables. I also regress a monthly average of the above spreads on
monthly averages of the above metrics, as well as other relevant economic variables. Results show the
spread is also significantly affected by variables measuring economic outlook, equity market volatility,
monetary policy, and treasury trading volumes. These findings suggest a framework to understand the
ways in which SOFR and LIBOR differ more precisely, and support observations by other academics that
LIBOR and SOFR behave very differently under extreme economic circumstances.

Introduction
The USD LIBOR is the most used reference rate in the world, with over 220 trillion dollars in
notional amount. It is a crucial feature in a multiplicity of financial markets, such as certain derivatives,
mortgage products and business loans in the United States. Historically, LIBOR rates represent interbank
unsecured lending over different terms and are computed every day by surveying participating “panel”
banks. Nonetheless, the declining volume of lending in this market, particularly for longer terms, has led
2

to increased discretion by bank officials in providing survey responses. In the financial crisis of 2008,
several cases of LIBOR rigging were made public, resulting in billions of dollars in fines to panel banks
(Burgess, 2019). These events put the viability of LIBOR to question, as the underlying market and
method to compute LIBOR lacked robustness. The series of manipulation lawsuits made increasingly
clear that LIBOR was a major legal liability for panel banks. Thus, several voices from the Financial
Stability Board, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) and academia called for LIBOR
reform. In response, the Federal Reserve Board convened the Alternative Reference Rates Committee
(ARRC), a group of private market participants tasked with the designation of a more appropriate
reference rate for the financial system and the development of a plan to implement this transition with
minimal disruption.
In 2017, the ARRC identified the Secured Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR) as the best fit to
take over LIBOR. SOFR is a fully-transaction based overnight rate based on the Treasury repo market,
with over $750 billion in underlying transactions every day (The Alternative Reference Rates Committee,
2018). It has been published daily since the second quarter of 2018. Furthermore, the ARRC published a
series of target dates for the cessation of new use of LIBOR in May 2020, with the earliest deadline
targeting September 30, 2020. Nonetheless, public data on daily transactions reveals LIBOR is still
widely utilized, although SOFR-based contracts are increasing in popularity.
To facilitate the transition, the ARRC has made available recommended product-specific fallback
language guidelines for existing LIBOR contracts, as well as extensive recommendations on how to
structure new products using SOFR. In September 2020, Bloomberg published an overview of the
recommended fallback methodology as the ARRC’s designated vendor for adjustment services
(Bloomberg Professional Services, 2020). In essence, the document suggests that market participants
adjust LIBOR contracts by replacing LIBOR with (1) a compound average of overnight SOFR over the
tenor of LIBOR involved, denominated the “adjusted” SOFR, plus (2) a spread adjustment. The spread
adjustment is calculated as the median of the spread between LIBOR and its corresponding “adjusted”
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SOFR during a five-year period prior to a fixing date. On March 5, 2021, ICE announced it would cease
to produce USD LIBOR’s 1-week and 2-month tenors after December 31st, 2021, and all other tenors by
June 30th, 2023 (ICE Benchmark Administration, 2021). This announcement constituted a trigger event
that set the fixing date to March 5, prompting Bloomberg to publish spread adjustments for all USD
LIBOR tenors (Bloomberg Professional Services, 2021). Even though this implies the popular 1-month
and 3-month LIBOR tenors will be produced for over 2 more years than expected, the ARRC has restated
the urgency of halting new use of LIBOR and incorporating robust fallback language into longer-dated
contracts.
Much of current academic and industry concern about SOFR stems from the fact that SOFR and
LIBOR are inherently different in several ways. For instance, LIBOR is a term rate (with the 1-month and
3-month LIBOR as the most used) while SOFR is an overnight rate and does not have a “natural” term
structure. Moreover, LIBOR is unsecured and reflects banks’ funding costs, while SOFR is fully secured
and thus a “risk-free” rate. Besides these explicit differences, each rate has its own set of idiosyncrasies
that prevent a straightforward answer to the question asked in the title. For instance, recent literature has
dived deeper into very interesting and relevant phenomena. Jermann (2019) showed the difference
between the two rates may be non-trivial in periods of financial distress. He found SOFR-indexed
business loans would have returned lower interest payouts to banks during the 2008 Financial Crisis. In a
recent paper, Klingler & Syrstad (2020) found financial variables such as government debt and bank
reserves have significant effects in SOFR. These findings motivate our research question and suggest
methods we can use to further study the differences between the two rates. Ultimately, we want to know
whether these differences will amount to a meaningful shift that requires non-trivial adaptation by
industry players. This concern remains a topic of active academic debate, and we hope to contribute
directly to this discussion.
This paper will attempt to answer the title question holistically. Firstly, we will present a
comprehensive synthesis of available information about how the rates differ, from players in the transition
4

as well as from academic literature. As the transition to SOFR is an ongoing process, relevant context will
be included in our discussion. Secondly, we will present simple quantitative analyses to better understand
how SOFR and LIBOR differ. We will study the spread of 1M and 3M USD LIBOR to overnight SOFR
in daily and monthly frequencies. We will regress the spreads on relevant economic and financial
variables that have a fundamental relation to the spread. Through our analysis, we hope to arrive at a more
precise understanding of what makes SOFR and LIBOR different.

Moving away from LIBOR
Early literature identified the likely future need of a transition away from USD LIBOR. Early
papers and reports described LIBOR’s problematic features and suggested many pathways for a possible
transition to alternative benchmark rates. In one of the earliest paper on the topic, Duffie & Stein (2015)
thoroughly elaborate on LIBOR’s importance in the financial market, present issues affecting it – such as
manipulation and a thin underlying market – and suggest possible solutions to these issues.
Duffie & Stein contributed to reports commissioned by the Financial Stability Board about how
to improve on benchmark rates such as LIBOR. A key feature of a good benchmark rate is that it is
transaction-based. The discretion of market participants when submitting LIBOR surveys introduces an
opportunity to falsify the submission to manipulate LIBOR. However, a transaction-based LIBOR would
necessitate enough interbank wholesale lending at each currently published tenor. As we have alluded to
earlier, there are not enough interbank loans to support a daily transaction-based LIBOR fixing, an
inherent flaw that would eventually lead to the introduction of a new benchmark.
Despite market participants’ awareness of its flaws, LIBOR has continued to grow in use, with
USD LIBOR used in transactions with combined nominal value of over $220 trillion by 2021. LIBOR’s
importance in the financial markets is clear. The TED spread, defined as the spread between 3M USD
LIBOR and the current 3-month treasury yield, is widely used to gauge general credit risk and economic
health, even though technically LIBOR only measures bank’s credit risk. Moreover, the use of LIBOR in
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the large interest rate derivatives market was born out of convenience over any judgement of adequacy.
Interest rate derivatives are meant to transfer risk related to changing market-wide interest rates, having
little to do with the bank credit risk embedded in LIBOR. As such, derivative markets may be better
served by a risk-free benchmark, such as SOFR.

From LIBOR to SOFR
After identifying SOFR as the unique rate to succeed LIBOR, the ARRC (2018) published its
Second Report, in which it provides thorough justification of its decision and points toward next steps and
key milestones necessary for implementation. Some of the main concerns mentioned were deciding on the
proper spread adjustment, the creation of a market that provided forward-looking SOFR term rates
analogous to LIBOR, and the development of a standard legal language to deal with the transition of
existing long-dated contracts (a fallback language). A paper from the Bank of International Settlements
(BIS) extends the above discussion to an international setting by addressing a worldwide trend of phasing
out LIBOR-like reference rates and replacing them with more robust, market-based and usually risk-free
options (Schrimpf & Sushko, 2019). The authors also suggest LIBOR may have a desirable behavior for
banks, as it tracks their own cost of funding. Burgess (2019) provides an overview and discussion of the
transition and introduces concerns over yield curve calibration methods and requirements for the new
reference rates, including SOFR. Lastly, Klingler & Syrstad (2020) compare SOFR with their British and
European counterparts, SONIA and ESTR. They find that several financial variables, such as government
debt, transaction volume and bank reserves, have diverse effects on the new reference rates.
A major point of concern is whether the unsecured nature of SOFR can have unwanted
consequences for the financial stability of banks in distress. Jermann (2019) claims LIBOR provides a
hedge to banks’ fluctuating funding costs. In periods of financial crisis, LIBOR rises with banks’ funding
costs because of an increased default risk premium; as a secured rate, SOFR does not exhibit this behavior
and would in fact be expected to fall due to monetary policy measures. In principle, this means switching
to SOFR for business loans could weaken bank’s balance sheet resilience during crises, which could have
6

significant macroeconomic effects. To measure these effects, Jermann employs a dynamic equilibrium
model of an economy in which banks lend to firms through floating rate loans indexed to their own
funding rate (representing LIBOR) or to the model-implied risk-free rate (representing SOFR). He studies
the effects of shocks to bank credit risk and aggregate productivity in bank defaults, firm investment, and
consumption under the two rates. He finds that switching from LIBOR to SOFR in business loans would
induce an increase in bank defaults, and a decrease in investment and consumption. While he reports that
the effects of the change under normal financial circumstances are negligible, they become significant
when the shocks are large enough, such as during the 2008 financial crisis. In his conclusion, he proposes
the use of different benchmarks for different purposes: a funding cost-based rate for business loans with
similar properties to LIBOR and risk-free SOFR for interest rate derivative applications. In a different
paper, Jermann presents an estimate of the additional interest banks have received by using LIBOR versus
counterfactual SOFR indexing methods during the financial crisis. He considers two possibilities for a
SOFR-indexed counterfactual: a compounded SOFR over the term of the LIBOR tenor, or a matching
term SOFR, for which he uses OIS term rates as proxies. He also takes an expected spread adjustment
into account for his analysis. Considering outstanding LIBOR-indexed loans from 2007 to 2009, he
estimates banks would have missed $33.3 billion if they used a compounded SOFR, and $26.7 billion if
they used a term SOFR. These cash flows represent between 1% and 2% of the total business loan
notional balance (Jermann, 2020). As of now, the ARRC has moved forward with compounded SOFR in
their fallback recommendations.
Other scholars do not consider this feature of SOFR to be cause for greater concern. Bowman et
al. (2020) respond to the general concerns raised by Shrimp & Sushko (2019) and Jermann (2019) that
LIBOR may have some desirable characteristics for banks and their financial health. First, they examine
whether LIBOR has historically risen higher than a comparable term risk-free rate during periods of
recession. They construct a series of OIS rates that extends to the 1990s, using fed funds futures and the
method described in Heitfield & Park (2019). The authors then examine how the LIBOR-OIS spread
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reacted to periods of recession, finding that although it widened significantly during the 2007-2009
financial crisis, it only widened moderately during the 1990-1991 recession and the recent but brief height
of the COVID-19 scare in March-April 2020. They point out the spread did not widen during the 2001
recession. With this analysis, they intend to show that the difference between LIBOR and a comparable
risk-free rate during recessions are moderate to insignificant for recessions outside of the financial crisis,
which was affected by idiosyncratic events that explicitly hurt banks’ credit worthiness. Furthermore,
they point out that regulatory reforms and higher reserve requirements for banks following the financial
crisis may have contributed to shorter and more moderate period of widening in the case of the COVIDinduced shock. Moreover, they point out that LIBOR is not a better indicator of banks’ overall cost of
funding than other secured rates, as wholesale unsecured borrowing no longer represents a significant part
of banks’ financing. Even though they concede the average cost of funding does not necessarily represent
banks’ marginal funding costs, they do note that LIBOR funding for banks played a significantly smaller
role in banks’ balance sheets since the financial crisis. That said, they argue that banks’ overall funding
costs have been closer related to risk-free rates since before the crisis. They present a correlation table that
shows a hypothetical 3-month SOFR would have been more correlated to banks’ overall funding costs
than 3-month LIBOR during the 2006-2011 window, which includes the financial crisis (Bowman et al.,
2020). Lastly, they consider that banks do have some LIBOR exposure not directly tied to wholesale
unsecured borrowing, such as issuances of senior or subordinated floating rate debt that is indexed to
LIBOR. The authors report that the total outstanding LIBOR-indexed debt of this kind amounts to ca.
$412 billion (Bowman et al., 2020). However, they argue these securities could instead reference risk-free
rates such as SOFR to reduce exposure to LIBOR.
As certain deadlines for SOFR adoption approach us, there has been increased attention to
modeling concerns under the new rate, motivated by uncertainties surrounding SOFR’s implementation in
practice. To replace a benchmark such as the 3-month LIBOR, either a 3-month backward-looking
compound average of SOFR or a 3-month SOFR forward-looking term rate would be needed. It has been
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shown in literature that the traditional LIBOR Market Model (LMM) can be naturally extended to the
backward-looking case (Lyashenko & Mercurio, 2019).
Another point of contention in the transition context has been the prospect of compound
averaging of SOFR versus a true term SOFR for inclusion in fallback language and market use beyond
the transition period. In a recent conference organized by the ARRC, multiple market participants
expressed their specific concerns on this controversy. While derivative users are keen on accepting
average compounding of SOFR to replace LIBOR, some industry players that hold LIBOR-indexed
business loans are not fond of this option, as the required interest payment is not known until a few days
before the payment is due, due to compounding in arrears over the corresponding LIBOR tenor (Wipf &
Morzaria, 2021). However, a proper SOFR term rate is not available for use by market participants at the
time of writing. Heitfeld & Park (2019) presented a method to compute implied SOFR term rates from
future contract prices, while caveating such an estimate was not appropriate for use as a benchmark.
Instead, the ARRC (2020) announced in April of 2020 that it would work toward fostering a more robust
SOFR derivatives market to make possible transaction-based SOFR term rates, and has already requested
proposals from parties interested in publishing these rates daily. Nonetheless, the ARRC has moved
forward with their initial recommendation of SOFR compound averages over LIBOR tenors plus a spread
adjustment for use in fallback language.
Due to the recent and emerging nature of this topic, a multiplicity of questions remains
unanswered. For instance, recall the observation that LIBOR offers an “insurance” to banks with LIBORindexed exposure (this is assumed for most banks, as they usually hold LIBOR-indexed business loans).
This is because LIBOR rises in times of financial distress, increasing cash inflows to banks when needed
the most (Jermann, 2019). A study providing a theoretical valuation of this insurance may suggest an
alternative way to adjust the spreads. Furthermore, many of the observations presented by Jermann focus
on the US case. Future research could attempt to replicate his results in other economies undergoing
similar LIBOR reforms to find out if international markets and their respective new reference rates show
9

the same dynamics. We expect that the idiosyncratic regulatory framework of other economies will affect
the degree to which the local IBOR is affected by financial distress.

What we know about SOFR
SOFR is usually characterized as a risk-free rate derived from transactions in the large and highly
liquid repo market. That said, SOFR is affected by a set of idiosyncrasies it inherits from the repo market.
Klingler & Syrstad (2020) present a thorough analysis and discussion of some factors that uniquely affect
SOFR and other similar benchmarks abroad. They point out that the SOFR-Overnight LIBOR spread
fluctuates significantly between -15 and +15 basis points, even though they both represent overnight
lending by low-risk borrowers and should be close to the risk-free policy rate. This observation
underscores the importance of understanding the factors driving SOFR’s movements away from the
policy risk-free rate, as even small movements can have large effects in valuation of interest-rate
derivatives of huge notional values.
Klingler & Syrstad (2020) note that repo market underlying SOFR comprises of collateralized
transactions consisting of bank-to-bank, non-bank-to-bank, and bank-to-non-bank lending. From this
observation, the authors first hypothesize that, under tighter regulatory constraints banks’ need for cash
and reluctancy to lend would drive rates up in a market where banks are lenders. Second, they
hypothesize that increases in government debt will drive increases in SOFR, as (1) lenders prefer
Treasuries over lending to banks, which decreases supply, and (2) more government debt in the system
induces higher demand for collateralized borrowing. Third, they hypothesize that, absent ample reserves,
a decrease in bank reserves with the Fed will increase bank’s demand for borrowing and drive rates
higher. The authors use regression analysis to test their hypothesis. They find that SOFR is indeed higher
by 20.25 basis points on average on quarter-end regulatory reporting dates. Across several tests, they find
a strong positive link between SOFR and government debt, measured as total Treasuries outstanding, as
well as a negative link between SOFR and bank reserves.
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While Klingler & Syrstad focus on the new reference rates and compared their relations to key
financial variables, they do not center their analysis around how the new rates are different from their
respective IBOR rates. That said, their methods suggest a simple way to study the spread between the old
and new reference rates, such that the quantitative results can drive useful insights on the differences
between new and old rates, as well as help assess the overall significance of this transition for market
participants.

Analysis
Our objective is to further the understanding of how SOFR and LIBOR differ. To this purpose,
we present a regression analysis of the historical LIBOR-SOFR spread. We consider the two most used
LIBOR tenors: the 3-month and 1-month term LIBOR rates. We form our dependent variables by
calculating their difference to SOFR at a daily frequency, and then compute monthly averages of the two
spread to analyze them at a monthly frequency. In total, we perform 2 daily regressions and 2 monthly
regressions – 1 per LIBOR tenor per frequency. We include details about our daily and monthly
frequency analyses below.
Daily Analysis
For our daily frequency analyses, we only consider metrics directly related to the interest rate
environment. We first identify three ways in which SOFR and LIBOR are fundamentally different:
1. LIBOR is a term rate, while SOFR is an overnight rate. Thus, LIBOR is affected by term
structure while SOFR is not.
2. LIBOR mostly affected by bank liquidity while SOFR is mostly affected by liquidity in
the Treasury markets.
3. LIBOR reflects unsecured borrowing by banks, and thus includes a bank credit risk
premium, while SOFR is collateralized and thus virtually risk-free.
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We assume the following equation describes the relationship between the above factors and the
LIBOR-SOFR spread:
1 + 𝑠𝑡, 𝑇 = (1 + 𝜏𝑡, 𝑇 )(1 + 𝜆𝑡, 𝑇 )(1 + 𝜌𝑡, 𝑇 )(1 + 𝜖𝑡, 𝑇 )
The subscript 𝑡 corresponds to each day. The variable 𝑠𝑡, 𝑇 corresponds to the spread of USD
LIBOR of tenor 𝑇 to overnight SOFR. The variables 𝜏𝑡, 𝑇 , 𝜆𝑡, 𝑇 , and 𝜌𝑡, 𝑇 represent appropriate measures
for term structure, liquidity and bank credit risk expressed as rates, which vary each day and with their
corresponding tenor. The error variable 𝜖𝑡, 𝑇 represents random noise in the LIBOR-SOFR spread. To
study this relationship through a linear regression, we apply a logarithmic transformation to obtain the
following expression:
ln(1 + 𝑠𝑡, 𝑇 ) = ln(1 + 𝜏𝑡, 𝑇 ) + ln(1 + 𝜆𝑡, 𝑇 ) + ln(1 + 𝜌𝑡, 𝑇 ) + ln(1 + 𝜖𝑡, 𝑇 )
ln(1 + 𝑠𝑡, 𝑇 ) = ln(1 + 𝜏𝑡, 𝑇 ) + ln(1 + 𝜆𝑡, 𝑇 ) + ln(1 + 𝜌𝑡, 𝑇 ) + 𝑢𝑡, 𝑇
We study the last equation by a regression analysis. If our metrics for term, liquidity and risk are
appropriate, we would expect coefficients next to the logarithmic terms to be close to 1.
As SOFR is only formally available since April 2018, we use SOFR proxies to study the behavior
of the spread before 2018 and include the financial crisis years. We use a hypothetical SOFR rate
provided by the Federal Bank of New York to cover the months starting August 2014 to March 2018. For
all previous dates, we use the Prime Dealer Survey rate. For our independent variables that account for
LIBOR and SOFR’s inherent differences, we pick three metrics that represent each one. To capture term
structure, we compute the difference between 3-month and 1-month OIS rates and the Fed Funds rate.
This is a measure of prevailing term structure of the risk-free interest rate. To capture liquidity
differences, we compute the difference between 3-month and 1-month OIS rates and 3-month and 1month Treasury yields. This spread is a proxy for banks’ liquidity penalty over the hyper-liquid treasury
markets. Lastly, to account for bank credit risk, we introduce risk premium metric based on LIBOR panel
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banks’ CDS spreads, computed in an analogous fashion to LIBOR. We choose CDS spreads to account
for bank credit risk as they have been shown to reflect the risk implied by key balance sheet ratios
(Chiaramonte & Casu, 2010). We note that our CDS measure is based almost fully on 1-year CDS
spreads for senior unsecured bank debt. The mismatch in term is likely to negatively affect the fit –
however, we lack other widely available measures of bank default risk, especially for 1-month and 3month tenors. We thus use a single risk premium metric for both tenors, i.e., we impose 𝜌𝑡, 1𝑀 =
𝜌𝑡, 3𝑀 = 𝜌𝑡 . Moreover, data for all LIBOR panel banks is not included, due to lack of availability. The
banks included in the calculation of our CDS-based risk measure are Citibank, Credit Suisse, J.P.
Morgan, UBS, Bank of America, Barclays, and RBC. Our full range of data for the daily analysis covers
the dates from January 1st, 2002 to December 18th, 2020, which accommodates recent data availability.
A table with each variable included in our daily regression analyses, a detailed description,
predicted sign of coefficient, and data source is included below:
Table 1. Daily Frequency Analysis: Variable Descriptions
Variable

Description

Source

Predicted Sign

DEPENDENT VARIABLES

𝑠𝑡, 1𝑀

Spread of the 1-month USD LIBOR to Bloomberg,
overnight SOFR or its proxies.
Federal Reserve
of New York

N/A

𝑠𝑡, 3𝑀

Spread of the 3-month USD LIBOR to Bloomberg,
overnight SOFR or its proxies.
Federal Reserve
of New York

N/A

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Term (1M)

𝜏𝑡, 1𝑀
Term (3M)

𝜏𝑡, 3𝑀
Liquidity (1M)

𝜆𝑡, 1𝑀

Difference between the 1-month OIS rate and
Bloomberg
the Federal Funds rate.

(+)

Difference between the 3-month OIS rate and
Bloomberg
the Federal Funds rate.

(+)

Difference between the 1-month OIS rate and
Bloomberg
the prevailing 1-month Treasury bill yield.

(+)
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Liquidity (3M)

𝜆𝑡, 3𝑀

Difference between the 3-month OIS rate and
Bloomberg
the prevailing 1-month Treasury bill yield.

(+)

A CDS-based measure of bank default risk.
We consider the CDS spreads of LIBOR panel
banks. We include only CDS spreads that are
based on contracts referencing senior
unsecured debt. For each day, we use a
waterfall method to compute the daily risk
metric. First, we average the CDS spreads of
contracts available for each bank, for each IHS Markit
date. If no 1-year quotes for a given bank are
available, we look for 5-year CDS quotes and
take their mean when available. Then, we take
the mean of the interquartile range of banks’
average CDS spreads each day. This procedure
is analogous to the one used to calculate
LIBOR daily, for each tenor.

Risk

𝜌𝑡

(+)

Monthly Analysis
Our monthly analysis is two-folds. First, we repeat the idea in our daily analysis on a monthly
frequency, by regressing the monthly average of the LIBOR-SOFR spread on monthly averages of the
fixed-income factors identified above. Second, taking into consideration remarks in Shrimpf & Sushko
(2019) and Jermann (2019), we hypothesize that LIBOR’s spread to a risk-free rate such as SOFR is
affected by conditions in the economy and financial markets. In a second regression, we consider metrics
to account for each of the following economic dimensions:
1. Forward-looking economic sentiment
2. Real economic activity
3. Financial market volatility
4. Monetary policy and reserves
5. Treasury market liquidity
We include (1) the month-over-month change in the Consumer Confidence Index to account for
forward-looking economic sentiment, (2) month-over-month change in Industrial Production to account
14

for real economic activity, (3) the VIX index to account for financial markets’ volatility, (4) month-overmonth changes in bank reserves with the Federal Reserve system, and (5) total Treasury market trading
volumes as a measure of liquidity in the Treasury and money markets. To correct for any end-of-month
idiosyncrasies, we take the monthly average of the LIBOR-SOFR spread and other daily variables
included in our second regression.
The following equations describe the proposed relationship between the LIBOR-SOFR spread
and dependent variables:
𝑠𝑡, 𝑇 = 𝜏𝑡, 𝑇 + 𝜆𝑡, 𝑇 + 𝜌𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡, 𝑇

(I)

𝑠𝑡, 𝑇 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1 ⋅ ∆𝐶𝐶𝑡 + 𝑏2 ⋅ ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡 + 𝑏3 ⋅ 𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 + 𝑏4 ⋅ ∆𝐵𝑅𝑡 + 𝑏5 ⋅ ∆𝑇𝑉𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡, 𝑇

(II)

A table listing each variable included in our monthly regressions, a detailed description, predicted
sign of coefficient, and data source is included below:
Table 2. Monthly Frequency Analysis: Variable Descriptions
Variable

Description

Source

Predicted Sign

DEPENDENT VARIABLES

𝑠𝑡, 1𝑀

Monthly average of the daily spread of the 1- Bloomberg,
month USD LIBOR to overnight SOFR or its Federal Reserve
proxies.
of New York

N/A

𝑠𝑡, 3𝑀

Monthly average of the daily spread of the 3- Bloomberg,
month USD LIBOR to overnight SOFR or its Federal Reserve
proxies.
of New York

N/A

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Term (1M)

𝜏𝑡, 1𝑀
Term (3M)

𝜏𝑡, 3𝑀
Liquidity (1M)

𝜆𝑡, 1𝑀

Monthly average of the difference between the
1-month OIS rate and the Federal Funds rate. Bloomberg

(+)

Monthly average of the difference between the
3-month OIS rate and the Federal Funds rate. Bloomberg

(+)

Monthly average of the difference between the
1-month OIS rate and the prevailing 1-month Bloomberg
Treasury bill yield.

(+)
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Monthly average of the difference between the
3-month OIS rate and the prevailing 1-month Bloomberg
Treasury bill yield.

(+)

𝜌𝑡

Monthly average of our daily CDS-based
measure of bank default risk. Computed as IHS Markit
described above.

(+)

∆𝐶𝐶𝑡

Month-over-month percentage change in the
Bloomberg
Consumer Confidence Index

(−)

∆𝐼𝑃𝑡

Month-over-month percentage change in
Bloomberg
Industrial Production

(−)

𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡

Monthly average of the CBOE Volatility Index Bloomberg

(+)

∆𝐵𝑅𝑡

Month-over-month percentage change in bank
Bloomberg
reserves with the Federal Reserve system.

(+)

∆𝑇𝑉𝑡

Month-over-month percentage change in
Bloomberg
Treasury volumes.

(−)

Liquidity (3M)

𝜆𝑡, 3𝑀
Risk

The justification for the predicted sign for each new variable is as follows. Consumer Confidence
and Industrial Production increase when economics are good, while LIBOR tends to decrease in such
times as bank default risk subsides. At the same time, the risk-free rate also tends to increase during
booms. Thus, the expected sign of coefficients next to ∆𝐶𝐶𝑡 and ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡 is negative. The VIX, which
measures volatility in the equity markets, tends to shoot upward in times of financial distress, which
usually coincides with falling rates and rising default risk. Thus, we expect its coefficient to be positive.
Bank reserves have at least two effects over the LIBOR-SOFR spread. First, during periods of financial
distress, the Federal Reserve tends to increase bank reserves to prevent liquidity shortages. This effect
suggests bank reserves increase as LIBOR increases. Second, bank reserves are somewhat negatively
correlated with SOFR, as banks with higher reserves have lower demand for borrowing in the repo
markets, as shown by Klingler & Syrstad (2020). Both effects amplify the LIBOR-SOFR spread, so we
expect the coefficient of ∆𝐵𝑅𝑡 to be positive. Lastly, liquidity in the treasury markets is usually higher in
financially healthy periods, and Klingler & Syrstad (2020) show treasury volumes are positively
correlated with SOFR. Thus, the coefficient of ∆𝑇𝑉𝑡 is expected to be negative.
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Results
Daily Analysis Results
The results of our daily regressions are found in the tables below. T-statistics appear below each
coefficient in parentheses, and *, **, and *** denote coefficients significantly different from zero at the
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Table 3. Daily, 1M regression results
Independent Variable
Intercept

ln(1 + 𝑠𝑡, 1𝑀 )
–0.000438***
(–7.39)

ln(1 + 𝜏𝑡, 1𝑀 )

ln(1 + 𝜆𝑡, 1𝑀 )

ln(1 + 𝜌𝑡 )

Years
R2

0.3595***
(9.80)
0.8471***
(56.68)
0.2187***
(21.81)
2002–2020
0.43
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Table 4. Daily, 3M regression results
Independent Variable
Intercept

ln(1 + 𝑠𝑡, 3𝑀 )
0.000124*
(1.90)

ln(1 + 𝜏𝑡, 3𝑀 )

ln(1 + 𝜆𝑡, 3𝑀 )

ln(1 + 𝜌𝑡 )

Years
R2

0.7138***
(25.60)
1.110***
(49.79)
0.4711***
(42.32)
2002–2020
0.46

All three variables are significant at the even stricter 0.001 level, for both terms. We show that
liquidity and term structure differences between LIBOR tenors and SOFR are significant as captured by
our liquidity and term premium metrics. As expected, both variables have positive coefficients, so relative
term structure and relative liquidity in the OIS market are acceptable proxies for equivalent features
determining LIBOR. Moreover, our CDS-based risk premium measure is also highly significant in both
regressions, even though CDS spreads used to compute it correspond to 1-year term credit risk.
Despite the achieved significance, our coefficients are mostly significantly different from one. An
exception may be our liquidity measure, whose coefficient is closest to one. In general, excess noise in
our metrics may not only hurt the overall fit but dampen the coefficients. Moreover, our risk measure has
a term that does not match that of either LIBOR tenor. We achieve an R2 of 0.426 in our 1M spread
regression, and an R2 of 0.466 in our 3M spread regression. The slightly higher R2 in the 3M case may be
driven by the fact that the risk measure is based on 1-year CDS contracts, closer to 3 months than 1
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month. Indeed, the risk measure coefficient moves closer to 1 at 0.47 versus 0.22 in the 1-month case.
Unfortunately, a more precise measure for 3-month or 1-month bank default risk was hard to come by, as
CDS data is available for contracts with a minimum of 6 months in tenor. In fact, the spread of LIBOR to
same tenor treasuries is taken as the standard measure for bank credit risk over shorter maturities.
To study where the fit is most lacking, we produce a plot of the regression residuals in the 3month and 1-month case.
Exhibit 1. Daily, 1M regression residuals

Exhibit 2. Daily, 3M regression residuals
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Both graphs are rather similar and reveal lack of fit is especially severe during the financial crisis
years, in 2007 and 2008. This is intuitive, as banks short term credit risk dominated the hikes in LIBOR,
and we do not have a risk measure that exactly captures this risk in the appropriate tenor. There is an
outlier corresponding to September 17, 2019, which corresponds to a day with an abnormal lack of
liquidity in the repo markets which caused the Federal Reserve to intervene. To better understand which
variables are providing the most explanatory power, we will present a variance decomposition procedure.
Daily Analysis: Variance Decomposition
We are also interested in understanding the explanatory power each variable contributes to the
LIBOR-SOFR spread. To achieve this, we present a variance decomposition procedure to be conducted as
follows. We record the R2 achieved when one variable is removed, and the others are kept in the
regression. The difference between this figure and the R2 of the full regression is the contribution statistic
for each variable. Proceeding in this fashion, we obtain the following tables.
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Table 5. Daily, 1M variance decomposition
Additional R2

% of Total

𝜏𝑡, 1𝑀

0.0111

2.53%

𝜆𝑡, 1𝑀

0.3706

84.89%

𝜌𝑡

0.0549

12.57%

Total

0.4365

100.00%

Table 6. Daily, 3M variance decomposition
Additional R2

% of Total

𝜏𝑡, 3𝑀

0.0710

13.31%

𝜆𝑡, 3𝑀

0.2687

50.34%

𝜌𝑡

0.1940

36.35%

Total

0.5338

100.00%

We see significant differences in additional R2 across the two tenors. The term structure term is
more important in the 3-month case than in the 1-month case. This can be rationalized as a 1-month tenor
is less different from an overnight tenor than a 3-month tenor is. In both cases, however, the term
structure measure contributes the least explanatory power according to our decomposition method. In
turn, the liquidity measure is the most important by this metric in both cases, contributing more than half
the explanatory power in both cases and close to 85% in the 1-month case. The risk measure is much
more important in the 3-month case than in the 1-month case, contributing over 36% of explanatory
power in the former while less than 13% in the latter. We hypothesize this is due to the underlying term of
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the risk measure (one year). This analysis provides further evidence that liquidity is the best measured
variable, with coefficients closest to one and most explanatory power.
Monthly Analysis Results
The results of our monthly regression are found in the tables below. In our monthly regression, all
rate-like variables are in basis points, and all change variables are in percentage points. T-statistics appear
below each coefficient in parentheses, and *, **, and *** denote coefficients significantly different from
zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 7. Monthly, 1M regression results
I. Fixed Income factors
Independent Variable
Intercept

𝑠𝑡, 1𝑀
–6.9358**
(–2.23)

𝜏𝑡, 1𝑀

𝜆𝑡, 1𝑀

𝜌𝑡

Years
R2

0.0926
(0.34)
0.9476***
(11.88)
0.2420***
(4.68)
2002–2020
0.50
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Table 8. Monthly, 1M regression results
II. Economic factors
Independent Variable
Intercept

𝑠𝑡, 1𝑀
–2.3608
(–0.44)

∆𝐶𝐶𝑡

∆𝐼𝑃𝑡

𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡

∆𝐵𝑅𝑡

∆𝑇𝑉𝑡

Years
R2

–0.7593***
(–3.73)
1.6213
(1.02)
1.0900***
(4.26)
0.2827***
(6.78)
–0.1596**
(–2.45)
2002–2020
0.42
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Table 9. Monthly, 3M regression results
I. Fixed Income factors
Independent Variable

𝑠𝑡, 3𝑀

Intercept

1.7168
(0.48)

𝜏𝑡, 3𝑀

𝜆𝑡, 3𝑀

𝜌𝑡

Years
R2

0.6857***
(4.08)
1.1419***
(9.65)
0.4494***
(7.44)
2002–2020
0.48
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Table 10. Monthly, 3M regression results
II. Economic factors
Independent Variable

𝑠𝑡, 3𝑀

Intercept

5.0529
(0.83)

∆𝐶𝐶𝑡

∆𝐼𝑃𝑡

𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡

∆𝐵𝑅𝑡

∆𝑇𝑉𝑡

Years
R2

–0.6035***
(–2.61)
–0.4327
(–0.24)
1.4140***
(4.86)
0.2829***
(5.96)
–0.1584**
(–2.14)
2002–2020
0.41
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On the fixed-income factor regressions, we find that our averaged risk and liquidity premiums
remain significant. However, our term premium metric does not achieve significance in the 1-month
spread case. The cause of weaker correlation may be averaging the variable over the term it is supposed to
account for, as it could cease to be meaningful. Notably, a higher R2 is achieved in our monthly
regressions compared to our daily analysis. We attribute this phenomenon to the averaging out of noise in
the spread that is not correctly captured by our fixed income factors in a daily basis.
On the economic factor regressions, it is important to note that a lower R2 is achieved on either
term, as compared to our fixed-income analysis. We can infer that fixed-income factors are better at
explaining the LIBOR-SOFR spread than solely economic factors. That said, the economic regressions do
achieve meaningful R2 of over 0.4 on both terms, which suggest economic variables can in fact explain
much of the spread.
VIX is highly significant on both terms. VIX captures risk and “fear” in the broader financial
markets, which usually correlates with the TED spread, a proxy for LIBOR’s credit risk component.
Recall that VIX is calculated from S&P500 stock options over the next 30 days. Thus, the “term” in the
risk measured by VIX is one month, which corresponds to 1M LIBOR tenor and is also closer to three
months than one year is. We may have that VIX is a better proxy for bank credit risk over 1 or 3 months.
However, we recognize VIX is fundamentally different from any direct measures of credit risk, such as
bond spreads or CDS spreads. Change in Consumer Confidence is highly significant in both regressions,
and bears a negative coefficient, as expected. However, change in Industrial Production fails to be
significant in both regressions and its coefficients have inconsistent signs. This may be due to the fact that
IP is a backward-looking variable, while 1M and 3M LIBOR are inherently forward-looking with respect
to the risk they capture. Changes in bank reserves also turn out to be significant in both regressions, with
positive coefficients consistent with our observation that the Fed increases bank reserves in times of
financial distress, which coincide with periods of high LIBOR. We recall that Klingler & Syrstad (2020)
report an moderate inverse relationship between SOFR and bank reserves, suggesting that, all else equal,
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the LIBOR-SOFR spread would widen with rising reserves, so both effects contribute in the same
direction. Lastly, changes in treasury trading volumes are also significant in both cases, with a negative
coefficient as expected. More liquidity in periods of financial health and a positive relation between
SOFR and treasury volume described by Klingler & Syrstad (2020) drive the sign in the same direction.
To visualize goodness of fit, we produce residual plots for all four regressions. We then discuss
how the fit differs between terms and between the two sets of factors.
Exhibit 3. Monthly, 1M regression residuals
I. Fixed Income factors

II. Economic factors
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Exhibit 4. Monthly, 3M regression residuals
I. Fixed Income factors

II. Economic factors

The most extreme outliers correspond to financial crisis months and are present in all four
regressions. Our observation is again that our variables cannot quite capture the extreme widening of the
spread during worst months of 2008. That said, the outliers are more moderate in the economic
regressions. Similarly, the 2020 COVID crisis outliers are only noticeable in the fixed-income
regressions. We hypothesize this is accountable to the VIX, which captures short-term risk in the financial
markets more precisely than 1-year bank CDS spreads. Monthly averaging of the spread may however
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dampen the spikes in LIBOR observed during the financial crisis and the spike in SOFR from September
17, 2019.
Monthly Analysis: Variance Decomposition
We are interested in the contribution of each included variable to the aggregate explanatory
power of our models. Again, we present a variance decomposition procedure based on additional R2. We
record the R2 achieved when one variable is removed, and the others are kept in the regression. The
difference between this figure and the R2 of the full regression is the contribution statistic for each
variable. Proceeding in this fashion, we obtain the following tables.
Table 11. Monthly, 1M variance decomposition
I. Fixed Income factors
Additional R2

% of Total

𝜏𝑡, 1𝑀

0.0003

0.00%

𝜆𝑡, 1𝑀

0.4500

86.07%

𝜌𝑡

0.0698

13.93%

Total

0.5228

100.00%
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Table 12. Monthly, 1M variance decomposition
II. Economic factors
Additional R2

% of Total

∆𝐶𝐶𝑡

0.0525

16.49%

∆𝐼𝑃𝑡

0.0039

1.23%

𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡

0.0679

21.33%

∆𝐵𝑅𝑡

0.1716

53.91%

∆𝑇𝑉𝑡

0.0224

7.04%

Total

0.3183

100.00%

Table 13. Monthly, 3M variance decomposition
I. Fixed Income factors
Additional R2

% of Total

𝜏𝑡, 1𝑀

0.0555

10.07%

𝜆𝑡, 1𝑀

0.3109

56.39%

𝜌𝑡

0.1849

33.54%

Total

0.5513

100.00%
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Table 14. Monthly, 3M variance decomposition
II. Economic factors
Additional R2

% of Total

∆𝐶𝐶𝑡

0.0258

9.64%

∆𝐼𝑃𝑡

0.0002

0.28%

𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡

0.0896

33.47%

∆𝐵𝑅𝑡

0.1347

50.32%

∆𝑇𝑉𝑡

0.0174

6.50%

Total

0.2677

100.00%

We first observe that total additional R2 is considerably lower than the R2 of the full model in the
economic regressions. This suggests there is significant correlations between our economic variables, as
one might expect. In contrast, total additional R is higher than model R in the fixed income regressions.
This points to lower correlation between fixed income variables. This supports our claim that the three
variables represent three distinct features of fundamental difference between SOFR and LIBOR.
On the fixed income regressions, we note that the liquidity measure is again most important in
explaining the LIBOR-SOFR spread given our methods. As for the risk measure, we obtain similar results
to our daily analysis. It gains explanatory power in the 3-month case, as expected. Our term measure,
however, suffers significantly in the 1-month case, likely due to monthly averaging. It remains a
significant explanatory variable in the 3-month case, but behind liquidity and risk in importance.
On the economic regressions, changes in bank reserves are the most important factor, followed by
VIX and consumer confidence. This result is sensible if we consider that changes in reserves are the most
related to changes in bank liquidity our of all our economic factors, and we know this is an important
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differentiator between SOFR and LIBOR from our previous regressions. VIX and consumer confidence
serve as proxies for the risk measure, as they capture current expectations about the near future of the
economy. Changes in treasury volume also adds significant information, as it is an additional measure of
liquidity in the financial markets. In contrast, change in Industrial Production does not have the same
property. As we discussed earlier, this variable may be too backward looking and cannot offer additional
information after forward-looking economic expectations are accounted for.

Conclusion
As LIBOR’s end nears, it is increasingly important for market participants to understand how the
transition will take place, as well as how is newcomer SOFR different from the old well-known rate.
Fundamentally, LIBOR is different from SOFR in term, liquidity, and risk. Regressing the LIBOR-SOFR
spread on measure for each of these three factors at a daily frequency shows they are all in fact
significant. LIBOR users will benefit from understanding how changes in the economy’s yield curve,
bank liquidity and bank credit risk has affected their pricing and how this will change with the
introduction of a compound average of overnight SOFR to replace LIBOR. Relating the spread to a
broader set of economic variables at a monthly frequency reveals how the spread differs under different
economic environments. We show the spread correlates with changes in the economic outlook, volatility
in the equity markets, changes monetary policy and Fed actions, and changes in liquidity in the treasury
markets. In general, our results are in line with the observations by Schrimpf & Sushko (2019) and
Jermann (2019) that LIBOR is higher in economic downturns that significantly affect the financial sector.
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